Why belief in god as father is important for christians

Thus, each Person just is God, but none is the same Person as any other divine Person. The account may be illustrated by modifying the traditional Trinity shield:. One may worry that such Persons must be one and the same Person since they have but one substance between them, but Mooney answers that they are individuated by their causal relationships, following Swinburne 5. Following Moreland and Craig , Mooney adds that God possesses three mental faculties, each had by one of the Persons 6.

Finally, adapting ideas from Swinburne , he says that. He remains neutral on whether this process is either temporal or necessary ibid. Unlike other relative identity theories, this account, like some one-self theories, affirms the absolute identity of each Person with God; each is the same thing or being or primary substance, God 7.

This generates a concern that the account may count as a heretical modalism. The reason is that on this account there are three episodes of personhood, which implies that there are three Persons, even though there is one being which is the component thing in each episode, a single subject of the properties that are involved in being a Person.

Even though the account has it that these three are different Persons, still, it identifies each with God, which entails their identity with one another; being the same thing as God, they must be the same thing as each other.

This, Mooney argues, shows why when counting objects, we should count by absolute identity, while when counting persons we should count by the relation same-person. In the Trinity, then, we count one thing but three Persons; the Persons are the same thing but different persons 9.

Mooney adds that the property being triune should not be confused with the property of being the same Person as someone who is triune; only the first, in his view, is an essential divine attribute 10—1. Mooney argues that this account also solves problems relating to divine processions and aseity. The Son, being God, must have the property of aseity. The viability of this theory rests on a particular metaphysics of personhood.

One might think, contra Markosian and Mooney, that the woman in the story is one being, the mummy is a second being even though composed of many or all of the same parts , and the man who follows is a third being. Similarly, one may wonder whether numerically distinct Persons can each be numerically the same as one god.

Does the original claim really mean what the analysis says? Some influential 20th-century theologians interpreted the Trinity as containing just one self. In the second half of the century, many theologians reacted against one-self theories, criticizing them as modalist or as somehow near-modalist. This period also saw the wide and often uncritical adoption of a paradigm for classifying Trinity theories which derives from 19th c.

But this paradigm has been criticized as confused, unhelpful, and simply not accurate to the history of Trinitarian theology Cross , ; Holmes ; McCall Although the language of Latin vs. Leftow ; Hasker c; Tuggy a , these have interpreted the different theories as logically inconsistent i. The views seem to range from tritheism, to the idea that the Trinity is an event, to something that differs only slightly, or only in emphasis, from pro-Nicene or one-self theories see section 1 and section 3.

However, a number of Christian philosophers, and some theologians employing the methods of analytic philosophy, have started with this literature and then proceeded to develop relatively clear three-self Trinity theories, which are surveyed here. They differ in how they attempt to secure monotheism Leftow There are many such Trinity theories, and it is not clear that all the options have yet been explored Davidson A problem for any three-self Trinity theory is that numerically three selves are, it would seem, numerically three things.

And according to a theory of essences or natures, a thing which has or which is an instance of an essence or nature is thereby a thing of a certain kind.

All Trinity theories include the Nicene claim that the Persons of the Trinity have between them but one essence or nature, the divine one. But it would seem that by definition a thing with the divine essence is a god, and so three such things would be three gods.

Swinburne aims to build his theory on widespread traditional agreements between most catholic theologians since at least the fourth and fifth centuries Swinburne , Section 1. Each is divine in that each has all the divine attributes. He argues that omnipotence entails perfect goodness and omniscience. While all three of the Persons exist necessarily inevitably , the Father does this independently while the Son and Spirit exist of necessity dependently, because necessarily, the Father exists, and his existence implies that he causes them , n.

This causing is traditionally described as the eternal generation of the Son by the Father, and the eternal proceeding of the Spirit from the Father, or from the Father and the Son.

The theory then is committed to one of these two models of the divine processions. Swinburne has constructed a couple versions of an argument which purports to show why, if there is at least one divine being or Person, there must be exactly three, with the second and third being caused ultimately by the first. In other words, given that it is possible that there be a divine Person, it is metaphysically impossible that there be only one, and it is metaphysically necessary that there be exactly three.

Most trinitarians have assumed that such an argument is neither possible nor desirable, as the Trinity can be known only by divine revelation. See the Monotheism entry, section 5. Suppose that one omnipotent being willed a certain object to move and simultaneously another omnipotent being willed that it should remain in place.

Swinburne argues that such conflicts of will are impossible given the omniscience, perfect goodness, and causal relations of the omnipotent beings.

Inspired by similar arguments given by Richard of St. Victor, Swinburne argues that a divine Person must be perfect in love.

Thus, if there is one divine Person, there must also be another. Further, there must be a third, for. What stops this process of deity-proliferation from careening into four, seventy-four, or four million divine Persons?

Swinburne replies that it is not better to cause four or more divine Persons than it is to cause three, since. Divinity, by implying moral perfection, implies the character trait of being perfectly loving. See also Tuggy See also Tuggy , These arguments are rebutted by William Hasker and the argument is continued in Hasker , Tuggy b, and Tuggy Then he observes,. However, see the opening line of the Nicene creed. What sort of thing is this Trinity? It is not a divine Person, and is not a thing person or not with the divine essence.

Rather, it is a thing of which the three divine beings selves, persons are proper parts Nor does it makes sense to worship it, as it is not the sort of thing which can be aware of our addressing it.

Daniel Spencer argues that the several factors which Swinburne and others appeal to in order to lend some sort of unity to the three persons are obviously inadequate to show how they amount to one God and not three gods.

At most, we get three divine beings who in some ways resemble a god. Spencer observes that sometimes Swinburne simply accepts tritheism, as when he says that there are three divine individuals or beings Spencer , , n. Spencer observes that in principle, making the Persons proper parts of a whole which is the only God might do the trick —6 , and Swinburne does suggest that there is a part-whole relationship between the Persons and God; however, for Swinburne the whole is not a god.

Perhaps the most sympathetic voice in the literature is William Hasker , Chapter 18 , but in the end he agrees that Swinburne has not done enough to unify the Persons. Hasker b, Chapters 25—8, , 5—7; Swinburne William Hasker b has constructed what is arguably the most developed three-self theory of the Trinity.

As with Swinburne, his thoughts have developed over decades Tuggy b , but this entry will focus on his recent publications. Chapter Hasker argues that such a view is widespread in ancient sources, including Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine Chapters 4—5, 9.

In the second part of his book Chapters 11—20 Hasker interacts with a number of Trinity theories, attempting to salvage whatever is correct in them for use in his own three-self theory; he incorporates ideas particularly from Leftow, Craig, Rea, and Swinburne. For Hasker, the Persons of the Trinity are three divine selves Chapters 22—5. Hasker holds that a crucial factor is the idea of their shared divine nature as a concrete property or trope. Following Craig, sometimes Hasker characterizes this concrete divine nature as a divine mind or soul.

He argues that this possibility is indirectly supported by split-brain and multiple-personality phenomena in human psychology. This supporting or sustaining relation, Hasker says, may optionally be specified to involve the divine nature constituting each Person Chapter Constitution is defined here as asymmetric, so none of the Persons also constitutes the divine nature In a later discussion, he seems to make constitution central to the theory Hasker a.

Adapting work on the metaphysics of material constitution by Lynne Rudder Baker, Hasker offers this definition:. Suppose x has F as its primary kind, and y has G as its primary kind. Then x constitutes y just in case. Applying this doctrine of non-material constitution to the Trinity, to say that the divine nature constitutes the Father is to say that those have all their parts in common and that the nature is in divine-Person-favorable circumstances.

Hasker clarifies that in his view all the entities mentioned here are simple lacking in proper parts , so each will be what metaphysicians call an improper part of one another, satisfying condition i. He also clarifies that the conceptual possibility in condition iv does not imply metaphysical possibility; Hasker denies that this is metaphysically possible: the divine nature exists but no divine Person exists He adds that. Presumably, the divine-Person-favorable circumstances which the divine nature is in, is support of these life-streams.

But Hasker suggests that. But while none of those qualities implies being human, each arguably implies selfhood. Yet Hasker denies that God is literally a self. Also, monotheism uncontroversially implies that there is exactly one god. But Hasker forbids saying that any of the Persons is a god. And by definition being a god implies having the divine nature, and like others Hasker understands divinity to imply perfection in knowledge, power to intentionally act, and moral goodness—thus, divinity implies being a self.

This, Howard-Snyder says, is a necessary truth and one with which basically all Christians agree. The Trinity monotheist says that even though there are three divine Persons, there is one God because there is one Trinity Moreland and Craig , ; Craig ; Layman , William Lane Craig has defended the best known such theory.

The aim is to go beyond mere analogies, providing a literal model of how to understand traditional trinitarian claims. Though only parts of one dog, each head is literally canine. If we were to upgrade the mental capacity of the three here, it would be one dog which is three persons. Change canine to divine, and this is the model of the Trinity. Only the Trinity, on this theory, is an instance of the divine nature, as the divine nature includes the property of being triune.

In a sense the theory divides the divine attributes between the Persons and the Trinity. Like Swinburne see section 2. For Craig this is a plausibility argument rather than a strict proof, in support of the claim that the concept of unipersonal God is incoherent.

Unlike Swinburne, he does not seem to think that this argument is important to reasonable belief in the Trinity Craig believes the Trinity can somehow be derived from the Bible—on which see section 5. The Cerberus analogy is criticized on the grounds that it would not be one dog with three minds, but rather, three dogs with overlapping bodies. This seems clear in the parallel case of human conjoined twins; everyone considers them to be siblings, two humans with overlapping bodies, not a human with two heads.

Thus, the theory implies polytheism —5. Here God is not a personal being, in the sense of being numerically identical with a certain self, even though it God has parts which are selves.

Craig wants to say, for example, that each of the three is all-knowing, and also that God is all-knowing, in that God has parts which are all-knowing. But Howard-Snyder objects that,.

According to Trinity monotheism, a thing can exemplify the divine nature without itself being a self. Nor can divinity include properties which require being a self, e. He is personal in the sense of having personal parts. As to the charge of polytheism, Craig accuses Howard-Snyder of confusing monotheism with unitarianism , i. Finally, Craig argues that the issue of whether or not the Three count as parts of God is unimportant — Stephen Layman has constructed a similar and arguably better developed three-self Trinity theory.

Motivated by the New Testament, Layman says that the three Persons of the Trinity are three selves — God the Trinity is literally a social entity, a concrete, primary substance which is strongly analogous to a living thing, and which like a living thing is a self-maintaining event — Layman answers that social entities are concrete, not abstract, and can intentionally act — Intentionally acting requires having intentions, but social entities may have these, even though they are not selves or even subjects of consciousness.

Social entities may have intentions because their parts i. Like Craig, Layman argues that the Trinity can be omnipotent, perfectly good, and omniscient because its persons are Why then is the Trinity not a fourth divine person see section 3. Layman concedes that the Old Testament does. But because they believe in progressive divine revelation, Christians should read the Old Testament as corrected by the New Testament. The account is not polytheism because only the Trinity is God, and because of the necessary unity of the three , How can the Son and Spirit be fully divine if each is caused by the Father and so does not exist a se?

The qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, eternality, perfect goodness, and necessary existence are sufficient to guarantee the worship-worthiness of the Persons ibid. Like Swinburne and Craig, Layman argues that a God who is a single self is impossible.

A solitary divine Person would be lacking this glory; but presumably a divine Person must have glory. The limit of divine Persons to three, in his view, can only come from the Bible —8. Christopher Hughes suggests a theory much like the Constitution theory section 2.

On this picture,. An objection is that the one God of Christianity is not supposed to be a portion of matter. Hughes replies that perhaps it is orthodox to say that God is a very unusual kind of matter They are consubstantial because they both bear this other relation to a third, substantiating thing. Thus, e. On this alternate view, though, what does it mean to say that God is the substance of a divine Person? Hughes suggests that the case is analogous to material objects.

Hughes ends on a negative mysterian note see section 4. Leftow objects that this theory features four things which are divine, which is at least one too many. He takes from Frege the idea that number-properties are concept-relative. There is no privileged way of conceptualizing [this portion of reality] in terms of which we can explain the other way.

Both ways are equally legitimate. Some think identity is of necessity a one-one relation, although others allow there can be many-many identity; for instance, it may be that the three men who committed the robbery are identical to the three men who were convicted of the robbery. Those who believe identity can be one-many typically do so because they accept the controversial thesis that composition the relation of parts to a whole they compose should be understood as identity. For example, we can recognize a certain human body to be identical to a certain plurality of head, torso, two arms, and two legs.

And we can recognize that a pair of shoes is identical to a plurality of shoes Rather, orthodoxy requires that the one God is identical to the Three considered as a plurality. And might the divine portion of reality equally well be conceived as seventeen? Joseph Long objects that the theory is unorthodox because it requires a type of thing which is divine and yet which is neither the Trinity nor any divine Person.

Sheiva Kleinschmidt argues that theories on which composition is explained in terms of identity are of no use to the trinitarian, for such theories add no significant options to the options the trinitarian already has Kleinschmidt Chad McIntosh formulates a Trinity theory which is similar to three-self theories except that it adds God the Trinity as a fourth divine self.

This theory is inspired by recent work by philosophers on group persons. This is particularly useful, e. But some philosophers have argued for group agency realism, the thesis that some groups of persons are themselves literal persons, with interests, knowledge, freedom, power to intentionally act, and moral responsibility — On this account the Persons of the Trinity are intrinsicist persons, while God the Trinity is a functional person McIntosh argues that since moral responsibility implies personhood of some kind , and it is clear that the Trinity must be praiseworthy, e.

As Leftow objects to another theory,. McIntosh replies that the tradition demands that there are exactly three Persons Greek: hypostases which share the divine nature or essence, which is captured by his claim that there are exactly three intrinsicist persons. This account does not claim that God is a fourth hypostasis, a fourth intrinsicist person.

Rather, God is a functional person, a person not by his essence, but rather who exists as a person because of the unified functioning of the Father, Son, and Spirit McIntosh argues that the theory neatly sidesteps a number of common objections to three-self theories: here, God is a self and not merely a group or a composite object which is less than a self. In contrast with three-self theories, as a literal self, personal pronouns may be literally used of him. See sections 2. Following some Old Testament scholars, McIntosh claims that ancient Israelites recognized many groups, including their own nation, as literal group, functional persons.

This one God is neither simple nor timeless, but is a temporally extended self with shorter-lived temporally extended selves as his parts. At any given time, only one self bears this relation of temporal-stage sharing with God. How can any of these selves be divine given that they are neither timeless nor everlasting? Each of these non-eternal selves, then, counts as the continuation of the previous one, and is everlasting in the sense that it is a temporal part of an everlasting whole, God.

The obscure traditional generation and procession relations are re-interpreted as non-causal relations between God and two of his temporal parts, the Son and Spirit 13—4. In a later paper, she argues that any trinitarian may and should accept this re-interpretation Baber But the Persons in this theory are not mere modes; they are truly substances and selves, and there are at least three of them, though each is counted as the continuation of the one s preceding him.

It is unclear whether the theory posits only three selves 10—1. This theory is notable in being a case not of rational reconstruction, but of doctrinal revision Tuggy a. In a later discussion Baber argues that some form or other of Sabellianism about the Trinity is theoretically straightforward and fits well with popular Christian piety. Further, such theories can survive the common objections that they imply that God is only contingently trinitarian, and that they characterize God only in relation to the cosmos.

While some Sabellian theories do have those implications, Baber argues that a trinitarian may just accept them , —8. Alternately, Baber develops a structuralist approach to the Trinity which doesn't imply anything about how many selves it involves. Koons holds that even everyday objects imply the existence of such intentional objects, i.

Thus, we can distinguish Trump-qua-husband from Trump-qua-President; while these are real objects of thought, they both amount to being properties of Trump, which Koons thinks of as metaphysical parts of Donald Trump.

Unlike most of the other theories in this entry, Koons builds his on the foundation of divine simplicity, traditionally understood. According to this, God is numerically identical with his nature, his one action, and his existence.

God has no accidental non-essential properties and no proper parts, and he just is any essential property of his. In sum, God has no parts or components in any sense The divine nature just is any divine attribute, e. Following Aquinas, Koons says that God a. Thus, the divine nature implies the existence of three relational qua-objects, which are the Persons of the Trinity.

Each of these four things—God the divine nature , the Father, the Son, and the Spirit—has the divine nature as its one metaphysical component, and each has all the divine attributes Each of those four is numerically distinct from each of the three others The theory requires more than the relation of absolute numerical sameness or identity. Like identity, this relation is reflexive and symmetrical, but unlike identity it is neither transitive nor Euclidian such that if any x is related to some y and to some z then this implies that y and z are related in that same way.

Thus, real sameness is not an equivalence relation , n. But no Person here is really the same as any other Person; all three are really distinct from one another.

To summarize: there are four divine realities on this model of the Trinity. The three Persons are so many qua-objects, while God is not. None of these four is really distinct from God; all are really the same as him. Yet none of the four is identical to any of the others One may ask why there should be only three qua-objects here, when objects like a human person or an apple, having many properties, might imply hundreds or thousands of qua-objects. The answer is that not every qua-object of God is a divine Person.

Many such, Koons says, are contingent, e. God-as-creator, or God-as-friend-of-Abraham; such would not have existed had God not created. And any qua-object of God which involves only an essential property of his, e. God-as-omnipotent, is numerically identical to God This last condition is meant to prevent the proliferation of divine qua-objects —6.

Koons argues that this account explains why there are exactly three divine Persons. So if the Father loves the Son, this implies that they are numerically distinct non-identical. It also implies that they are really distinct and not really the same. In specifying what he means by real distinctness Koons writes,. The distinction between these qua-objects Father and Son is intrinsic to their ultimate base, God the divine nature because he is the intrinsic yet relational property of love —9.

Koons argues that this theory has many advantages over some rivals. Against the constitution based three-self theory of Brower and Rea see section 2.

And their theory requires three different odd and hard to explain personal attributes Koons recognizes that many will object that this theory is tetratheism; it features four realities, each of which is divine; prima facie, these would be four gods. Koons believes that the real sameness of each of the Persons with God should rule out any polytheism and rule in monotheism. He offers this definition of monotheism:.

Thus the meaning of this definition can be restated as:. Put differently, one may count things by identity. One may wonder here how the four realities can be equally divine. It would seem that whereas God the divine nature would not exist because of any other, and so would exist a se , each of the qua-object persons would exist because of God, their base. Again, on this account each of these four is intrinsically and essentially divine, yet the Persons can love, while God can not.

How then can all four be omnipotent? Some will judge this theory to inherit all the problems of the traditional divine simplicity doctrine it assumes. Others will consider its fit with simplicity to be a feature and not a bug. Koons points out that it also assumes constituent ontology, a Thomistic account of thought, and the claim that the divine nature is an intentional relation The view is that God, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are all improper parts of one another, while none is numerically identical to any other.

This is shown in the following chart; the lines represent the symmetrical and transitive improper parthood relation. He argues that this change is not merely theologically motivated, but may be applicable to other issues in metaphysics —3.

Molto discusses a problem for the model which arises from the transitivity of parthood and the axiom that things which are improper parts of one another must have all their proper parts in common.

In response, he adds three further elements to the model, as shown here:. As before, the lines with arrows on each end represent the symmetrical improper parthood relation. In this illustration the one-arrow lines represent the asymmetrical proper parthood relation. Thus, the divine nature of the Son and the human nature of the Son are proper parts of the composite Son, and the human body is a proper part of the human nature and thus, also of the composite Son.

Molto leaves it up to theologians whether this sort of theory is orthodox —7. His suggestion is only that this may be a simpler and less controversial solution to the logical problem of the Trinity, that is, to showing how trinitarian claims do not imply a contradiction. Mysterianism is a meta-theory of the Trinity, that is, a theory about trinitarian theories, to the effect that an acceptable Trinity theory must, given our present epistemic limitations, to some degree lack understandable content.

In this extreme form, mysterianism may be a sort of sophisticated position by itself—to the effect that one repeats the creedal formulas and refuses on principle to explain how, if at all, one interprets them. More common is a moderate form, where mysterianism supplements a Trinity theory which has some understandable content, but which is vague or otherwise problematic.

Thus, mysterianism is commonly held as a supplement to one of the theories of sections 1—3. Again, it may serve as a supplement not to a full-blown theory i. See section 3. Unitarian views on the Father, Son, and Spirit are typically motivated in part by hostility to mysterianism. But the same can said of many of the theories of sections 1—3.

Mysterians view their stance as an exercise of theological sophistication and epistemic humility. Some mysterians appeal to the medieval tradition of apophatic or negative theology, the view that one can understand and say what God is not, but not what God is, while others simply appeal to the idea that the human mind is ill-equipped to think about transcendent realities.

It is most common for theologians to combine the two views, though usually one or the other is emphasized. Sophisticated modern-era mysterians include Leibniz and the theologian Moses Stuart — Antognazza ; Leibniz Theodicy , 73—; Stuart , 26— The negative mysterian holds that the true doctrine of the Trinity is not understandable because it is too poor in intelligible content for it to positively seem either consistent or inconsistent to us.

The Persons of the Trinity, in this way of thinking, are somewhat like three men, but also somewhat like a mind, its thought, and its will, and also somewhat like a root, a tree, and a branch. Some recent studies have emphasized the centrality of negative mysterianism to the pro-Nicene tradition of trinitarian thought, chastising recent theorists who seem to feel unconstrained by it Ayres ; Coakley ; Dixon The practical upshot of this is being content to merely repeat the approved trinitarian sentences.

Thus, after considering and rejecting as inadequate multiple analogies for the Trinity, Gregory of Nazianzus concludes,. Opponents of this sort of mysterianism object to it as misdirection, special pleading, neglect of common sense, or even deliberate obfuscation. They emphasize that trinitarian theories are human constructs, and a desideratum of any theory is clarity.

Negative mysterians reply that it is well-grounded in tradition, and that those who are not naively overconfident in human reason expect some unclarity in the content of this doctrine. That is, the doctrine seems to contain explicit or implicit contradictions.

So while we grasp the meaning of its individual claims, taken together they seem inconsistent, and so the conjunction of them is not understandable, in the sense explained above. The positive mysterian holds that the human mind is adequate to understand many truths about God, although it breaks down at a certain stage, when the most profound divinely revealed truths are entertained.

Sometimes an analogy with recent physics is offered; if we find mysteries i. Orthodox belief about the Trinity, Anderson holds, involves believing, for example, that Jesus is identical to God, the Father is identical to God, and that Jesus and the Father are not identical. Similarly, one must believe that the Son is omniscient, but lacks knowledge about at least one matter.

These, he grants, are apparent contradictions, but for the believer they are strongly warranted and justified by the divine testimony of scripture.

He argues that numerous attempts by recent theologians and philosophers to interpret one of the apparently contradictory pairs in a way that makes the pair consistent always result in a lapse of orthodoxy , 11— A stock example is a man viewing apparently red objects.

The man then learns that a red light is shining on them. In learning this, he acquires a defeater for his belief that the items before him are red. Anderson argues that it does not, at least, if she reflects properly on the situation. Having seen that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinct Persons, that they are each fully God, and that there is nonetheless only one God, we must conclude that all three Persons are the same God.

In other words, there is one God who exists as three distinct Persons. We baptize into the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Second, notice that each Person must be deity because they are all placed on the same level.

In fact, would Jesus have us baptize in the name of a mere creature? Surely not. Therefore each of the Persons into whose name we are to be baptized must be deity. Third, notice that although the three divine Persons are distinct, we are baptized into their name singular , not names plural.

The three Persons are distinct, yet only constitute one name. This can only be if they share one essence. This leads us to investigate more closely a very helpful definition of the Trinity which I mentioned earlier: God is one in essence, but three in Person.

This formulation can show us why there are not three Gods, and why the Trinity is not a contradiction. In order for something to be contradictory, it must violate the law of noncontradiction.

This law states that A cannot be both A what it is and non-A what it is not at the same time and in the same relationship.

In other words, you have contradicted yourself if you affirm and deny the same statement. For example, if I say that the moon is made entirely of cheese but then also say that the moon is not made entirely of cheese, I have contradicted myself.

Other statements may at first seem contradictory but are really not. Theologian R. But he avoids contradiction with this statement because he means that in one sense it was the best of times, but in another sense it was the worst of times.

Carrying this concept over to the Trinity, it is not a contradiction for God to be both three and one because He is not three and one in the same way. He is three in a different way than He is one. Thus, we are not speaking with a forked tongue — we are not saying that God is one and then denying that He is one by saying that He is three.

This is very important: God is one and three at the same time, but not in the same way. How is God one? He is one in essence. How is God three? He is three in Person. Essence and person are not the same thing. God is one in a certain way essence and three in a different way person. Since God is one in a different way than He is three, the Trinity is not a contradiction.

There would only be a contradiction if we said that God is three in the same way that He is one. So a closer look at the fact that God is one in essence but three in person has helped to show why the Trinity is not a contradiction.

But how does it show us why there is only one God instead of three? It is very simple:. All three Persons are one God because, as we saw above, they are all the same essence. This should make it clear why it is so important to understand that all three Persons are the same essence. What we have seen so far provides a good basic understanding of the Trinity. But it is possible to go deeper. If we can understand more precisely what is meant by essence and person, how these two terms differ, and how they relate, we will then have a more complete understanding of the Trinity.

What does essence mean? As I said earlier, it means the same thing as being. To be even more precise, essence is what you are. Of course we are speaking by analogy here, for we cannot understand this in a physical way about God. Therefore it is often difficult to have a concrete definition of Person as we use it in regards to the Trinity.

How do they relate? The relationship between essence and Person, then, is as follows. These personal distinctions are modes of existence within the divine being, but are not divisions of the divine being. They are personal forms of existence other than a difference in being. As theologian and apologist Norman Geisler has explained it, while essence is what you are, person is who you are.

Neither should we think of the Persons as being defined by attributes added on to the being of God. Wayne Grudem explains:. Rather, each person of the Trinity has all of the attributes of God, and no one Person has any attributes that are not possessed by the others.

On the other hand, we must say that the Persons are real, that they are not just different ways of looking at the one being of God There are many illustrations which have been offered to help us understand the Trinity.

While there are some illustrations which are helpful, we should recognize that no illustration is perfect. Unfortunately, there are many illustrations which are not simply imperfect, but in error.

This explains how God can be both one and three. God is not one person who plays three different roles, as this illustration suggests. He is one Being in three Persons centers of consciousness , not merely three roles. This analogy ignores the personal distinctions within God and mitigates them to mere roles. The Trinity is first of all important because God is important.

Jesus spread teachings of compassion and healed people who were sick. The life of Jesus, as described in the Gospels , also demonstrates that sacrifice and suffering are important parts of the human experience. God the Holy Spirit helps Christians to understand the idea that God is always present in the world.

This is a source of strength to most Christians as they feel God is always with them. In the Gospel of Matthew there is a significant moment when Jesus is being baptised by John the Baptist:.

The concept of the Trinity is often referred to during worship, which helps Christians to understand it. For example:.